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We explore the role of dealers to determine whether they are liquidity-providing 
market makers or liquidity-taking information traders.  Standard models of market 
making, such as Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Miller (1988), imply a negative 
contemporaneous correlation between market maker order flow and stock returns.  
We test this relation with a unique dataset containing trades of all dealers in a 
well-developed, liquid market.  The correlation is strongly positive, implying that 
dealers take liquidity.  We also develop a unique profit decomposition to compare 
intraweek information and market making profits.  Dealers earn significant excess 
returns, in aggregate driven by information rather than market making.  Subgroup 
analysis reveals that information profits are positive and increasing in stock 
capitalization, and market making returns are positive and significant for all but 
the largest stocks. 
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Dealers in most financial markets are proprietary traders who are assumed to provide liquidity, 
and therefore they are granted special trading privileges related to order flow and trade execution.  
Such privileges include access to order flow and order flow information, direct connections to 
exchange trading mechanisms, and the right to bypass brokers, which allows for lower transaction 
costs and faster trade execution.  These advantages allow dealers to trade quickly, efficiently, and at 
low cost relative to the rest of the market.  In return for these trading advantages, dealers are 
expected to perform the socially beneficial and profitable function of supplying liquidity. 
In general, when liquidity providers trade, there will be a negative contemporaneous 
correlation between their order flow and stock returns.  This follows from both information and 
inventory models of market maker trades, as typified in Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Miller 
(1988).  Kyle shows that competitive market makers transact against net (informed plus 
uninformed) trade demand, with a price impact due to the potential information content embedded 
in net demand.  Grossman and Miller show that in the absence of informational issues, market 
makers are willing to accommodate temporary order imbalances if they can transact at 
advantageous prices.  In both of these models, other market participants push the price up (down) 
when they buy (sell), while market makers trading to accommodate the order imbalance must sell 
(buy).  Thus, market maker order flow will be negative (positive) when stock returns are positive 
(negative), implying the negative contemporaneous relation.   
In this paper, we examine whether the typical advantages granted to dealers induce them to act 
as liquidity providers.  The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) grants dealers a direct connection to the 
electronic exchange trading mechanism, which in turn allows them to avoid otherwise mandatory 
broker fees and trading delays.  Thus, TSE Dealers have smaller marginal trading costs, higher 
transaction speed, and closer access to the market than other investors in the TSE; in effect the same 
advantages granted to other dealers across the world.  However, unlike some others, TSE Dealers 
are not constrained to provide two-sided quotes or “stable and orderly” markets; they have a free 
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market decision whether or not to provide liquidity.  It is important to note that liquidity provision 
in the Grossman and Miller model is also a free market provision; dealers willingly provide 
liquidity in return for the expected profits from transacting at a spread from fair value.  By studying 
unconstrained TSE Dealers, we gain insight about whether these advantages naturally induce 
liquidity provision. 
Contrary to policy motivation and model intuition, our two main findings both suggest that 
dealer advantages do not induce liquidity provision.  First, the contemporaneous correlation 
between weekly dealer order flow and stock returns is strongly positive, implying that dealers do 
not provide liquidity at a weekly frequency.  Second, using detailed intraweek transaction price and 
quantity data, we develop a unique method to decompose dealer profits.
 1  We find that dealers earn 
significant excess returns that are driven by information profits rather than market making profits.  
The information-driven returns reinforce the main result by showing that dealers do little to provide 
liquidity within the week.  The small magnitude of market making profits relative to information 
profits suggests that either dealers actively choose not to provide liquidity or that liquidity 
provision is not a highly profitable activity. 
Our results are particularly surprising because dealer advantages give a great comparative 
advantage for high-turnover trading strategies.  While long-term investors may desire such 
privileges, market makers require them to profit from the high-frequency trading nature of liquidity 
provision.  However, we find that instead of inducing market-making behavior, these trading 
advantages enable dealers to be super-efficient information traders.  Dealer activities, such as 
focusing on order flow information, may enable them to deduce material pricing information.  Low 
transaction costs and high transaction speeds may allow them to take advantage of such 
information-driven opportunities that would not otherwise be profitable.  Thus, assuming that 
                                                 
1 Detailed definitions of information profits and market making profits are in Section II. 
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dealers want to maximize profits, their privileges may very well induce information as the primary 
motive for trade. 
In most models of dealer trades, dealer roles and profits are analyzed assuming that they trade 
primarily as market makers.  Given this fundamental premise, these models show that dealers take 
into account asymmetric information and hold order imbalances as their own inventory for 
potentially extended periods.  In return, they are compensated with an amount related to half of the 
bid-ask spread
2 for each trade.  Madhavan and Smidt (1993) develop a model that includes target 
inventory levels, information asymmetry, and liquidity provision as motives for dealer trading.  In 
spirit, their model incorporates the idea that dealers may strategically trade on information.  Still, 
their model implies a negative relation between dealer order flow and returns, which is consistent 
with trading primarily for market making motives.  Empirical research about dealer trades also 
typically takes as given that dealers are market makers and analyze the data as such.  These studies, 
including Ho and Macris (1984), Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1991), and many others, 
typically focus on high-frequency datasets and phenomena.  They often have data for relatively few 
dealers and short time periods.  Appropriately, the valuable contributions that these studies make 
are regarding issues that are not likely to be affected by the limited data, such as determining 
components of the bid-ask spread, analyzing price-discreteness effects, and disentangling 
high-frequency information and inventory motives for trade. 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study whether the institutional advantages 
granted to dealers impart the incentive to provide liquidity.  We use a unique and comprehensive 
dataset of dealer trades, transaction prices, and inventory, over a five-year horizon.  We aggregate 
                                                 




trades across all dealers in the market to lessen effects of individual dealer idiosyncrasies, and we 
use over five years of data to mitigate period-specific relations.   
Section I describes the dataset and market in detail, Section II defines the hypotheses and 
corresponding empirical tests, Section III documents the test results, and Section IV concludes with 
a brief summary, institutional implications, and directions for future research. 
 
 
I.  Data and Markets 
A.  Database 
We use the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database of equities traded on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange from January 1997 to January 2002.  In particular, we use weekly price and dealer trade 
data.  This is a comprehensive dataset of all individual dealer trades, including inventory levels, 
gross buys (and sells), and average gross buy (and sell) prices.  This unique data allow us to explore 
dealer trading and profits in great detail.  To better understand this data, we first list some TSE 
summary statistics in Table I and then describe the institutional setup of the TSE.
3
 
INSERT TABLE I 
 
Table I illustrates the clear pattern that large capitalization stock returns were higher.  The 
average market cap of the largest quartile is roughly (in New Taiwan Dollars) NT$70 billion, or 
roughly US$2.1 billion.  The average market cap of the smallest quartile is about 33 times smaller.  
This illustrates the magnitude and variation across equity capitalizations in this market.  We also 
                                                 
3 All information regarding the TSE, SFC, and financial system in Taiwan is sourced directly from the TSEC 
website at http://www.tse.com.tw/docs/eng_home.htm, the TSEC Fact Book (2002), the TSEC Annual 
Report (2002), and a conversation with an anonymous TSE representative. 
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see the pattern that smaller stocks had larger autocorrelations at almost all lags.  Given the time 
period of 255 weeks, or the full 261 weeks less 6 weeks to create lags (implying a standard error of 
autocorrelation estimates of roughly 0.063), there are several statistically significant values for lag 
1 through lag 3 autocorrelations in smaller stocks. 
Total Market Capitalization of stocks listed on the TSE in 2001 was NT$10.25 trillion (roughly 
US$316 billion) in 2001 for 614 listed stocks.  Annual market volume was NT$18.35 trillion, so 
dollar turnover in 2001 was 179% (compared to roughly 100% dollar turnover on the NYSE in 
2001).  While market capitalization and dollar volume obviously track market prices, share volume 
has remained relatively stable around 600 billion shares per year since 1996.  Taiwan’s equity 
market includes a wide range of participants, including local and international investment 
companies, banks, and individuals.  The TSE is a large, well-regulated, highly liquid market in 
which many traders participate, so it is not as susceptible to price manipulation as typical emerging 
markets may be. 
 
B.  TSE Background and Institutional Setup 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) was established in 1961 as a private 
institution overseen by the government.  The TSEC has operated the TSE, the sole centralized stock 
exchange for listed securities in Taiwan, since its founding.  In 1985, the original open outcry 
trading system was replaced by a computer-assisted limit order system; and finally the Fully 
Automated Securities Trading (FAST) system was implemented in 1993.  FAST is a pure limit 
order system with similar price/time priorities and trading rules as other limit order markets, such 
as the Paris Bourse and Toronto Stock Exchange.  Trades are processed through a series of call 
auctions executed approximately every 30 seconds.  The opening call auction is similar to that on 
the NYSE, with the opening price determined chosen to maximize trading volume on the opening 
trade.  There is no price limit for the opening call auction, but over our data sample there was a 
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2-tick price change limit on subsequent call auctions
4 and a 7% limit on daily price fluctuations.  It 
is worth noting again that using weekly data mitigates many of the high-frequency microstructure 
issues associated with particular institutional setups (bid-ask bounce, discrete prices, etc.).   
Therefore, we do not explicitly consider these issues in our analysis. 
Both listed (TSE stocks) and over-the-counter (OTC stocks) stocks are traded on the TSE 
platform under the same trading rules.  Listed stocks meet more stringent stability and size 
requirements, and the value-weighted performance of listed stocks determines the TAIEX index.  
TSE stock trading is restricted to occur only on the TSE platform, while OTC stocks may be traded 
off the system at prices negotiated between parties (the 7% daily price change limit still holds, but 
2-tick rule does not).  In practice, most OTC stock trades still take place on the TSE platform.  Our 
data do include all trades executed on the TSE system (all TSE stock trades and most OTC stock 
trades).  Trade data are collected and recorded by Taiwan’s Securities and Futures Commission 
(SFC) and reported to the TEJ, insuring completeness and reliability. 
 
C.  TSE Dealers 
Only two types of institutions may submit trades directly to the TSE trade execution system: 
TSE Brokers and TSE Dealers.  All other individual and institutional trades must be submitted 
through TSE Brokers.  Brokers have access to the TSE system purely to facilitate customer trades 
in exchange for commissions.  They are not allowed to trade on their own accounts, and their trade 
data is not publicly available. 
TSE Dealers are institutions that trade on their own accounts.  The minimum capital required to 
be a Dealer is NT$400 million (approximately US$12 million), and NT$10 million (approximately 
                                                 
4 Tick sizes and stock prices are in NT$, in format: Tick(stock price bounds) = tick_value.  Tick(S<5) = .01; 
Tick(5≤S<15) = .05; Tick(15≤S<50) = .1; Tick(50≤S<150) = .5; Tick(150≤S<1000) = 1; Tick(S≥1000) = 5. 
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US$350 thousand) must be left in an interest-bearing account as a security deposit.  Dealer access 
to the TSE is for own-account trading purposes only, and their namesake portrays the SFC’s 
desired role for them as liquidity-providing market makers.  In Taiwan Securities & Futures 
Markets (2003), the SFC states that, “By conducting proprietary trading, the (TSE) dealers increase 
market liquidity and help to stabilize the market.”  However, they have no explicit mandate to 
provide two-sided quotes in any security, and they are free to choose which securities to trade in.  
Since they are afforded access to the TSE system and are explicitly forbidden to trade on insider 
information, their trade data are readily available.  See Table II for summary statistics about TSE 
Dealer trades and Figure 1 for Dealer trading dollar volume percentiles. 
 
INSERT TABLE II and FIGURE 1 
 
As shown in Table II, the number of dealers during our sample period ranged from 49 to 72.  
There is a noticeable 1-week autocorrelation in aggregate dealer net turnover
5, which decays 
rapidly.  Average weekly net turnover was -0.009%, implying that dealers generally sold a little 
over the sample period, while average weekly gross turnover was 0.226%.  Average weekly net 
dollar volume was –NT$440 thousand, and average weekly gross dollar volume was NT$41.6 
million.  TSE Dealers accounted for roughly 2% of total share trading volume
6.  This guarantees 
that they are not the only source of liquidity, if they are in fact providing liquidity.  Figure 1 
illustrates the cross-sectional difference in dealer trading activity, plotting dollar volume at the 10%, 
50%, and 90% levels. 
 
                                                 
5 Turnover carries the implication of a standardized measure of unsigned trading volume.  However, we use 
“net turnover” to indicate standardized dealer order flow, defined as [shares bought – shares sold] / [shares 
outstanding].  Similarly, “gross turnover” is defined as [shares bought + shares sold] / [shares outstanding]. 
6 From 1997 to 2001, TSE Dealer trades accounted for only 1.37% to 1.94% of total dollar trading volume. 
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D.  Dealer Transaction Speed and Cost Advantages 
Only TSE Brokers and Dealers have direct connections to the TSE computer trade execution 
system, and they can enter trades as fast as they can key them in (they are allowed multiple trade 
terminals).  They also receive detailed transaction reports instantly upon trade execution.  All other 
traders have to trade through Brokers as an intermediary.  Internet trading was not widely available 
(well under 1% of the volume traded consisted of internet orders over the sample period), and even 
where available brokers were forced to manually print and key in internet orders.  Hence, the 
actions required for a typical individual or institutional investor’s trade consisted of making a 
phone call and describing the trade to a broking agent, the broking agent transmitting the trade to 
the Broker’s order-entry person, and the order entry person keying in the order.  Confirmation of 
the trade occurred after the TSE trade sheet was sent from the trading room to the broking agent and 
the broking agent had time to call back the customer.  For many customers, trade confirmation did 
not occur until the customer received the trade sheet in the mail.  Clearly, TSE Dealers had a large 
advantage in trade execution and confirmation speed before internet transactions, and even now 
they still enjoy a significant advantage over internet traders who must interact with brokers. 
Brokers can set their own commission rates up to a ceiling of 0.1425% of the value traded, and 
most set commissions very close to this rate.
7  Since Dealers do not have to trade through brokers, 
they avoid this brokerage cost.  Given the minimum tick price grid is about 10-20 basis points for 
over 75% of stocks, a trading discount of 28.5 basis points relative to other market participants puts 
TSE Dealers at a huge advantage for high turnover trading strategies.  However, this advantage is 
clearly not critical for long-term investors: saving 28.5 basis points on a position held for a year or 
more is marginally meaningful at best, and such meager savings would require a huge investment 
                                                 
7 Internet trading costs ranged from 20 – 28.5 basis points round trip.  Less than 1% of trading volume was 
through internet orders over the sample period. 
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to justify the costs of maintaining TSE Dealer status.  Seppi (1997) models dealer trading 
advantages as discounted trading and instant execution ability.  TSE Dealers advantages are almost 
identical to Seppi’s theoretical advantages, so in theory they should enable dealers to profit from 
liquidity provision. 
 
E.  Order Flow Information 
Quote from TSEC website in October 2002, “…the current order book is a black box where no 
unexecuted volume is disclosed (to the public).  Starting July 1st of this year, the volume of 
unexecuted orders at best bid and ask prices will be disclosed so that market participants can make 
an informed judgment when placing orders. Beginning 2003, the volume of unexecuted orders of 
the 5 best bid and ask prices will be disclosed as well.”  Therefore, only very recently has any order 
book information been available to the public.  The only order flow information available over our 
sample period was quotes of execution prices and aggregate daily volume.  Other “ticker-style” 
order flow information was also available through fee-based terminals.  It may be an interesting 
event study to explore the structural changes in the market caused by the recent changes in market 
transparency, but that is not within the scope of this paper. 
 
F.  Similarities to Other Markets 
Taiwan is just one of many countries whose major stock exchanges are pure limit order markets.  
Other examples include Canada, France, Germany, Korea, and others.  Even the NYSE and 
NASDAQ have significant portions of their market that work as limit order aggregation 
mechanisms via ECNs.  Though they may not always be explicitly called “dealers” in other markets, 
it is a common assumption that there are agents in every market looking to profit by 
accommodating order imbalances.  These agents typically have no inside information and no 
exogenous need for immediate trade, regardless of the particular institutional setup or location.  We 
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conjecture that the basic results of this paper should extend to such agents in other pure limit order 
markets and “limit order market segments” (such as ECNs in US markets) of dealer/specialist 
markets. 
The basic results are also likely to extend to specialists and dealers in non-limit order markets, 
as long as the specialists or dealers have discretion over which trades to participate in and are 
granted institutional trading advantages.  The basic premise is that if specialists and dealers have 
discretion over which trades to participate in, then they implicitly also have discretion whether to 
make markets or to trade on information.  We hope to confirm our results in other markets given the 




A.  Hypothesis 1: Dealers Trade as Liquidity-Providing Market Makers 
Most models of dealer trades imply that when dealers act as market makers to provide liquidity, 
there will be a negative relation between stock returns and aggregate dealer trades.  Our primary 
hypothesis is based on this implied relation.  The intuition is the following: as overall demand from 
all informed and uninformed traders increases (decreases), dealers providing liquidity is 
tantamount to dealers selling to (buying from) the rest of the market.  Insofar as other traders have 
informational or mechanical price impact, the stock price will increase (decrease) while dealers are 
selling (buying), creating a negative contemporaneous relation between the returns and dealer order 
flow. 
Consider two of the seminal models of market maker trading, Kyle (1985) and Grossman and 
Miller (1988).  Kyle explores the inference problem and trading demands of uninformed market 
makers and informed traders, with noise traders essentially adding uncertainty.  In his model, 
informed traders submit trades x in the direction of their information based on their trading 
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aggressiveness, uninformed traders submit trades u for exogenous reasons, and market makers 
trade against the net demand (if net demand is x + u then market makers trade –x – u) with a price 
impact determined by informed plus uninformed trader demand.  This price impact will be in the 
direction of the net demand x + u, further defined by the optimal (positive) market depth λ provided 
by the market maker.  This price impact exists regardless whether the net demand in a given period 
is driven by informed or uninformed traders.  As long as the ex-ante price is fair, the 
contemporaneous return is negative (positive) when a Kyle market maker buys (sells) shares; i.e. 
market maker order flow and security returns are negatively correlated.   
Grossman and Miller consider market maker trading from an inventory risk perspective.   
Market makers are willing to provide liquidity when there is a net trade imbalance because they can 
transact at a superior price.  The greater the imbalance, the better the price they can transact at.  In 
return for holding a suboptimal inventory for a potentially extended period of time, they are 
rewarded with a premium that will be realized whenever the net trade imbalance returns to zero.  
Essentially, the model predicts that liquidity-providing market makers buy at lower than fair prices 
and sell at higher than fair prices.  For example, assume the ex-ante price is fair and no information 
is revealed.  Grossman and Miller market makers will only buy (sell) at a price below (above) fair 
value, so the price decreases (increases) when they buy (sell).  Eventually, when the order 
imbalance disappears and they sell (buy), they do so at the higher (lower), fair price.  Thus, Kyle 
(1985) and Grossman and Miller (1988) show that both asymmetric information and inventory 
models imply the same negative contemporaneous relation between market maker trades and 
security returns. 
Our primary test of the contemporaneous correlation is a modified vector auto-regression 
(VAR) of dealer order flow and stock returns.  In a typical VAR, only lagged variables are included 
as independent variables, but we include the contemporaneous dealer order flow as an independent 
variable in the return regression (and vice versa) since this is precisely the relation we are interested 
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in.
 8  Dealer order flow drives contemporaneous returns, and this is the justification for including 
contemporaneous order flow as an independent variable in the return regression.  However, since 
we use weekly data for our tests, it is possible that causality also exists in reverse direction (returns 
may drive contemporaneous dealer order flow if there are trade motives other than liquidity 
provision, such as intraweek momentum trading), so we include the other contemporaneous 
variable in both the return and order flow regressions. 
9  We focus our discussion on the return 
regression because the causality in that case is driven by liquidity provision, whereas the reverse 
causality would be driven by alternative null hypotheses (momentum trading, etc.).  By using the 
VAR, we can measure the contemporaneous correlation while controlling for up to six-week 
momentum or contrarian effects and delayed price impact of dealer trades and gain insights about 
such predictive relations.  Our basic VAR specification is shown in Equations (1) and (2), where r 





























We estimate this VAR with raw returns, index-adjusted returns, and size-quartile-index 
adjusted returns for robustness.
10  Dealer order flow is defined as aggregate dealer net turnover, or 
[net shares bought by dealers] / [shares outstanding].  Lo and Wang (2000) describe how this 
standardized measure of dealer order flow controls for shares outstanding and provides for cleaner 
                                                 
8 Since our modified VAR is not correct in a strict econometric sense, we do the following robustness check.  
We calculate the correlation of the residuals from a standard VAR (including only lagged dependent 
variables as independent variables).  All results are qualitatively identical to our modified VAR results. 
9 See Hasbrouck (1991) for a clear discussion of a VAR of order flow and returns, particularly for including 
contemporaneous order flow as an independent variable in the return regression. 
10 In preliminary tests, we did not find significant return patterns across book/market ratios or market beta, 
hence we do not consider these potential risk factors in our return adjustments.  Furthermore, momentum of 
up to six weeks is already effectively controlled for in the lagged return independent variables. 
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interpretation of empirical results relative to share or dollar order flow.  Since individual dealers 
have unique considerations such as inventory management and investment strategies, we aggregate 
order flow across dealers in each period to reduce the effects of dealer idiosyncrasies. 
As a practical matter for empirical applications of VARs, i, j, k, and l, are chosen as finite lags.  
There is no consensus method to determine the “correct” number of lags to include in such a 
regression.  We include six lags (enough to study and correct for predictive relations of up to six 
weeks), which we feel is enough given our summary statistics that autocorrelation does not exist in 
either returns or order flow beyond three weeks. 
In the context of our VAR specification, Hypothesis 1 can be restated as follows: B0 and D0 
have negative sign.  This would be consistent with dealers that provide liquidity. 
 
B.  Hypothesis 2: Dealers Earn Excess Returns 
After establishing whether dealers provide liquidity, we test the profitability of dealers in 
aggregate to determine whether they earn excess returns.  Any outcome from testing Hypotheses 1 
would be relatively benign if dealers are not any more profitable than the average market 
participant.  However, if dealers are making excess returns using their institutional advantages, 
then this is a direct social cost of providing them these advantages.  Since we have detailed 
intraweek transaction price and quantity data, we are able to test exact dealer profits much more 
accurately than most previous studies.  In particular, we can disentangle returns attributable to 
information and to market making. 
In each period, we split dollar profits and returns into three components: information, market 
making, and mixed.  This dollar decomposition is similar to that in Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara 
(2000) and (2002), except that we separate the mixed profits from information profits.  After 
calculating the dollar profits from each stock in a single period, we sum the profits across stocks 
and dealers.  The initial base for conversion to return is the inventory value of all dealer holdings at 
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the beginning of the week.  This base maintains the relative importance of each component and 
allows us to sum the components to calculate total weekly return.  In other words, the total dollar 
profit is the sum of the dollar profit components, and the total return is the sum of the return 
components. 
Finally, we convert the market making and information dollar profits to returns based on 
dollars employed for each individual purpose.  The market making base is the average between the 
buy and sell value of stocks traded within the week, and the information base is the 
beginning-of-week value of stocks held for the entire week.  Although returns calculated with these 
bases no longer sum to the total weekly return, this return conversion is more appropriate to 
understand the individual component returns.  These base values represent capital employed for 
market making and information, respectively, instead of total value of inventory.  We report the 
time-series average weekly returns, both raw and adjusted for the value-weighted index return.  We 
also report subgroup analysis by stock capitalization. 
To calculate the dollar profit of each component in a particular time period, we first split the 
stocks into those in which aggregate dealer net trading was positive and negative.  The formulas for 
profit breakdown of a single stock in week t are shown below. 
 
] [ ] [ ] [ nent MixedCompo t ngComponen MarketMaki nComponent Informatio + + = ∏   ⑶ 
)] ( * [ )] ( * [ )] ( * [ ) ( 1 1 buy t buy sell t t t P P NetBuy P P GrossSell P P INV NetTrade − + − + − = + − − ∏ ⑷ 
)] ( * [ )] ( * [ )] ( * [ ) ( 1 1 sell t buy sell t t t P P NetBuy P P GrossBuy P P INV NetTrade − + − + − = − − − ∏ ⑸ 
 
Equations (4) and (5) denote profits from the cases where dealer net trading is positive and 
negative, respectively.  INVt-1 (INVt) is the share inventory level at the beginning (end) of the period 
t; GrossSell (GrossBuy) is the gross shares sold (bought); Psell (Pbuy) is the average sell (buy) price 
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for the shares sold (bought); NetBuy is the net shares bought; and Pt (Pt-1) is the price at the end 
(beginning) of the period.  The terms in brackets represent profits from information, market making, 
and mixed, respectively. 
Information dollar profits are defined as the increase in value of the inventory held for the 
entire period.  These profits can be attributed to information because dealers were committed to 
hold the inventory for an extended period (at least the entire week), indicating they believed that 
such positions in the stocks might be profitable.  If dealer order flow in a given stock is positive 
(negative), then the amount held for the entire period is the inventory from the beginning (end) of 
the period.  The dollar profits on the inventory are calculated based on the return of the stock and 
this definition of shares held for the entire week. 
Market making profits are dollars earned from shares bought and sold in the same period.  
These profits are attributed to market making because of the nature of providing short term 
liquidity.  Providing short-term liquidity is tantamount to buying when there are too many sellers in 
the market and selling when there are too many buyers.  In each case, the goal is to trade at an 
advantageous price due to the order imbalance and to undo the position when the imbalance 
disappears.  This is equivalent to the famous quote, “Buy low, sell high!”  To the extent that dealers 
are able to first buy and then sell (or vice versa) shares of a security within the same week, they are 
trying to do just that.  If dealer net trading is positive (negative), then the relevant number of shares 
is the dealer gross sell (buy) amount.  Since we have actual transaction prices for the gross buys and 
sells, we can calculate a very exact estimate of the dollar profit from these market making trades. 
Mixed dollar profits exhibit inseparable features of both inventory and market making profits, 
and they are attributable to the net dealer trade in a stock.  If net dealer trading is positive, then 
dealers bought the stock during the week and held it as inventory until the end of the week.  If net 
dealer trading is negative, then they held inventory from the beginning of the period and sold 
sometime during the week.  Mixed profits are attributable to information to the extent that these 
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shares are held for part of the week, but they are attributable to market making to the extent that 
dealers traded at advantageous prices caused by order imbalances.  Since it is impossible to identify 
whether they traded for information or market making motives, we differentiate these profits from 
the first two categories. 
 
C.  Hypothesis 3: Dealers Infer Relevant Pricing Information 
Because dealers focus attention on order flow information, it is possible that they can infer 
material pricing information.  Though we cannot directly test this hypothesis, two manifestations of 
this would be significant return predictability of dealer trades and significant profitability of dealers.  
No further tests are required to draw these conclusions; we simply reinterpret the results of testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
First, if aggregate dealer order flow has significant predictive price effects, then this would 
indicate that dealer trades contain information.  By observing the lagged order flow coefficients in 
the return regressions from Hypothesis 1, we can determine whether such price effects exist.  
Furthermore, we can even conjecture likely trading strategies.  For example, if prices continually 
drift in the direction of dealer trades, this would indicate that dealers “under-trade” on the 
information they infer and they do not reveal the full information set they have with their trades.  
On the other hand, if prices tend to drift in the opposite direction of dealer trades, this indicates that 
they “over-trade” on their information and possibly employ positive-feedback strategies
11. 
Second, if dealers are profitable relative to appropriate benchmarks, then it is likely that their 
advantages in execution efficiency or access to information are driving the profits.  Tests for 
Hypothesis 2 will indicate whether dealers are earning excess returns.  By splitting profits into 
                                                 
11 Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a) show that informed traders may “overtrade” relative to 
their information, while typical models show that informed traders “undertrade” to strategically minimize 
information release. 
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components derived from information and market making, we can infer whether it is dealer 
information that drives profits. 
The interpretations in this hypothesis will only be suggestive of whether dealers can truly infer 
material pricing information.  However, we feel it is an important question, and we attempt to 
address it in our suggestive way until better tests are devised. 
 
D.  Hypothesis 4: Dealers Trade More During Periods of Severe Order Imbalances 
If dealers are performing the function of providing liquidity, then their relative volume (dealer 
volume / total market volume) should be higher when order imbalances are severe.  Anecdotally, 
the correlation between order imbalance severity and periods of high volatility or kurtosis is high.  
Numerous media articles and academic papers point out that there are very few buyers during 
market crashes, even after prices drop below “fundamental” prices.  Literature about market 
crashes and the role of institutions, such as Gennotte and Leland (1990), offer explanations for the 
lack of liquidity during periods of extreme volatility.  Not only is the social function liquidity 
provision most important to other market participants during these periods, it is also these periods 
(when prices have likely diverged from fundamentals) during which expected profits from 
providing liquidity should theoretically be the highest.  Therefore, if market makers are providing 
liquidity by accommodating order imbalances, we should observe greater relative dealer trade 
activity during periods of higher volatility and kurtosis. 
For each stock in each month (indexed by t), we calculate volatility and kurtosis of daily returns 
as well as daily dealer trading volume divided by total market volume.  The following are the 
simple regression specifications: 
 
t t t t volatility me marketvolu me dealervolu ε β α + + = ) / (   ⑹ 
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t t t t kurtosis me marketvolu me dealervolu ε β α + + = ) / (   ⑺ 
t t t t t kurtosis volatility me marketvolu me dealervolu ε β β α + + + = 2 1 ) / ( ⑻ 
 
We implement the regressions as in Fama and MacBeth (1973).  First we run cross-sectional 
regressions for each time period.  Since each cross-sectional regression has a different number of 
observations depending on the number of stocks that dealers traded in the period, we calculate 
weighted (by degrees of freedom) time-series average parameter estimates and t-statistics.  Our null 
hypothesis implies positive values of β, β1, and β2. 
 
E.  Hypothesis 5: Dealer Trades Are Contemporaneously Correlated 
To justify our cross-sectional aggregation of dealer trades in the previous tests, we now test 
whether dealer trades are contemporaneously correlated.  If so, then aggregation helps to isolate 
general relations and mitigate the effects of trades made for idiosyncratic reasons.  If not, then 
dealers are simply a random set of market participants trading for wholly idiosyncratic reasons.  In 
this case, aggregating dealer trades would simply pick up the trading patterns of the largest dealers.  
Contemporaneous correlation between traders’ order flow has been tested in several papers 
exploring the concept of herding
12, such as Wermers (1999).  The consensus benchmark used in 
these papers is the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) (henceforth LSV) measure.   
Essentially, their measure captures the contemporaneous correlation between dealer trades while 
correcting for the probability to find such correlation in random data.  The original LSV herding 
formula for a single security i in a single time period t is shown in Equation (8). 
 
                                                 
12 Though the word “herding” may have several interpretations and implications, we are interested only in 
herding as defined by the contemporaneous correlation between dealer trades. 
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B(i, t) and S(i, t) are the numbers of buyers and sellers, p(t) is the expected proportion of buyers 
in the current time period (calculated as the proportion of buyers across all stocks in the period), 
and AF(i, t) is an adjustment factor equal to the expected value of the first term (inside absolute 
value bars) given the null of no herding and a binomial distribution of B(i, t) vs. S(i, t), with 
probability of B(i, t) equal to p(t).  The typically reported measure is H , or the average of H(i, t) 
across all stocks and time periods.  This measure should only be applied to specific group of traders, 
since, by definition, herding does not exist when aggregating all traders. 
We calculate H  once with p(t) as originally conceived by LSV, as the proportion of buyers 
across all stocks and all dealers in time period t.  This indicates a null that the probability a dealer 
will buy is the average probability that any dealer bought in a time period.  This measurement of p(t) 
corrects for market-level herding, whether caused by systematic capital inflows to the investment 
company or macroeconomic market-level news.  This implies that if every single dealer buys (or 
sells) the same n securities and does not sell (buy) any, then the herding measure for every stock in 
the period will be zero, even though this might instead reflect extreme herding.
13  For our modified 
herding measure, we recalculate the H  with p(t) equal to 0.5, reflecting a null that half of dealers 
would buy and half would sell in every period given no herding.  This measurement of p(t) is 
relevant if any market-level herding is driven by idiosyncratic, stock-specific reasons.  This 
                                                 
13 Since LSV studied pension fund herding, there were specific reasons why their measure of p(t) was 
appropriate for their study.  In particular, correlated fund inflows and outflows to pension funds might cause 
macro-level herding even without any information.  Since dealers do not have such correlated fund flows, we 
consider an alternate specification of p(t) that does not correct for macro-level effects. 
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alternative null reflects herding caused by both individual stock herding and market-level herding, 
regardless whether market herding is driven by market-level news or stock-level news. 
 
 
III.   Empirical Results 
We briefly summarize the primary empirical results, followed by a more detailed description of 
the tests and results.  Our first major finding is that aggregate dealer order flow exhibits a strong 
positive contemporaneous correlation with returns, inconsistent with both the theoretical models 
discussed earlier and the liquidity-providing role that dealers are supposed to play.  Additionally, 
dealers earn consistently higher returns than the value-weighted stock index, driven by their 
information trades.  This suggests that the advantages dealers are afforded in transaction speed and 
information access are advantageous in an economically significant way.  These intraweek results 
support the initial finding. 
 
A.  Test 1: Dealers Trade as Liquidity-Providing Market Makers 
The primary result of this paper is the rejection of Hypothesis 1.  Dealers do not act as 
liquidity-providing market makers.  As discussed earlier, this is equivalent to finding a positive 
contemporaneous correlation between aggregate dealer net turnover and stock returns. 
We use several methods to calculate the contemporaneous correlation, but the primary reported 
results are from the VAR.
14  To estimate the coefficients, A, B, C, and D, we implement weighted 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) style cross-sectional regressions with time-series significance tests.  We 
test variations of the basic VAR, using only TSE stocks, TSE plus OTC stocks, controlling for 
                                                 
14 As mentioned in Section II, we also calculated the correlation of residuals from a standard VAR with only 
lagged variables.  The pooled correlation coefficient was 0.056 (t-statistic 16.6) and the Fama and Macbeth 
(1973) style correlation was 0.067 (t-statistic 10.4).  T-statistics from simple correlations of returns and order 
flow and univariate regressions range from 6.10 to 9.53. 
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overall market turnover, and not controlling for overall market turnover.  Wang (1994) shows that 
overall market turnover and stock returns should have a strong relation, and we confirm this in our 
data.  As a robustness check, we also run pooled regressions and bootstraps to estimate standard 
errors
15 for each variation.  These results are qualitatively identical.   
 
INSERT TABLE III 
 
The t-statistics for the contemporaneous relation between return and dealer net turnover range 
from 8.53 to 9.91 in the return regressions and from 6.28 to 8.43 in the turnover regressions, 
indicating a strong significance regardless of the details of the specification.  Panel D reports what 
we believe to be the “cleanest” results, since OTC stocks are omitted to eliminate potential 
off-exchange price effects
16 and overall market turnover is included as a control variable.  In the 
return regression of Panel D, contemporaneous dealer order flow is both economically and 
statistically significant, with a coefficient of 2.025 and a t-statistic of 9.91.  An interpretation is that 
for each 1% of shares outstanding purchased by Dealers in a given stock in a week, the return for 
that stock will increase by roughly 2.025%.  The turnover regressions have a less intuitive 
interpretation, but also reflect the same strongly positive relation between returns and dealer order 
flow.  The results and interpretations for other panels are similar, and each reconfirms the positive 
contemporaneous correlation.
17   
                                                 
15 First, we randomly chose 255 time periods (our trade data includes 261 periods, and we needed the first six 
to create lags) with replacement.  For each time period, we included all contemporaneous and lagged dealer 
turnover and stock return variables for all stocks.  We ran the pooled regression with this dataset and recorded 
the coefficient estimates, and this comprised a single iteration.  We ran 3,000 iterations of this procedure and 
calculated t-statistics with the standard deviations of the estimates. 
16 All subsequent results use only listed stocks, unless otherwise specified. 
17 In the rest of this section, we continue to focus on Panel D unless otherwise stated. 
 
23  
One potential argument against the result is that perhaps dealers are simply block traders that 
have a mechanical price impact when they trade.  Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) find an 
analogous tick-by-tick, contemporaneous price effect of 0.295% for downtick trades and 0.158% 
for uptick trades.  However, they also find that by the end of the trading day, the permanent price 
effect has diminished to between 0.076% and 0.081% (for downtick and uptick trades, 
respectively).
 18  Our results only include what they would define as permanent weekly effects.  
Holthausen et. al. show that price impact is detectable on a tick-by-tick basis, but is dramatically 
reduced by the end of the trading day.  Extrapolating from this result, permanent weekly price 
impact should be almost nonexistent.  Our permanent weekly contemporaneous price effect dwarfs 
both the contemporaneous and permanent daily effect found by Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers.  
Since dealers trade less than 2% of dollar volume, it is unlikely that sheer trade size is driving this 
price effect.  Results from Test 2 will also suggest that information drives the positive relation. 
 
B.  Test 1: Causality and Higher Frequency Implications 
Since we have only weekly dealer trade data, the positive contemporaneous relation is 
conclusive evidence only that dealers do not provide liquidity on a weekly basis.  However, we do 
have a limited ability to draw the same conclusion at a higher frequency, given the lag 1 predictive 
relations in the VAR.  If the lag 1 predictive relations are not strongly positive, this indicates that 
the positive weekly contemporaneous relation also holds for a higher frequency (perhaps up to 
daily).  In the return regression, the coefficient of lag 1 order flow is 0.033 with a t-statistic of 0.18.  
This indicates that order flow from the previous week (even from the last day of the previous week) 
does not at all cause an increase in current week return (even from the first day of the current week).  
                                                 
18 Holthausen et. al. (1987) study the total price effects as the sum of temporary and permanent price effects.  
Total price effects are the tick-by-tick price change from before a block trade, and permanent price effects are 
the price change from before a block trade to the same day closing price. 
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The coefficient of lag 1 return on the order flow regression is 1.37 x 10
-4 with a t-statistic of 1.57.  
This indicates that return from the previous week also has no effect on order flow in the current 
week.  The conclusion most consistent with this evidence is that returns and dealer net turnover 
move together within the week.   
 
C.  Test 1: Other Noteworthy Effects 
Other significant findings illustrated in the VAR are positive return autocorrelations, evidence 
of momentum trading, inventory decay, and the overall market turnover control variable.  First, 
return autocorrelation coefficients for lag 1 – lag 3 returns are positive.  The effect is stronger in the 
OTC stocks because they are smaller in capitalization.  This confirms that the positive weekly 
autocorrelations and pattern across size shown in the summary statistics still hold after correcting 
for dealer order flow and market turnover.  Second, there seems to be some weekly momentum 
trading by dealers.  In the order flow regression, coefficients on lag 1 to lag 6 returns are all positive, 
and the coefficient on lag 4 return is significantly positive.  This indicates that dealers may be 
following a monthly momentum trading strategy.  Third, dealers continue to build up inventory 
after the first week and then slowly sell out of the position.  In the order flow regression, the lag 2 to 
lag 6 autocorrelation coefficients are all negative.  In fact, in separate tests we found that the order 
flow autocorrelation coefficients are universally negative from lag 2 to lag 15, indicating that 
dealers continue trading out of new positions over 15 weeks or longer.  Finally, the overall market 
turnover control variable has effects in both the return and turnover regressions, though it does not 
affect the other coefficients.  In the return regression, the t-statistic on turnover is 6.41 implying 
that higher turnover is associated with higher excess return.  On the dealer order flow regression, 
the t-statistic for overall market turnover is -2.95, indicating higher market turnover is associated 
with dealers decreasing inventory.  Given the short sale restriction, if market makers are truly 
providing liquidity, then true market makers should increase inventory to provide liquidity during 
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periods of high market turnover.  Instead, this is additional evidence that dealers do not provide 
liquidity. 
 
INSERT TABLE IV 
 
Table IV shows the same VAR specification, this time in the more typical form without 
contemporaneous variables.  This table illustrates that the secondary effects described above also 
hold in the traditional VAR framework. 
 
D.  Test 1: Subgroup Analysis and Patterns 
We estimate three subgroup variations of the basic VAR to further explore the main result.  
Because some quartiles had few observations per period, we report the results from pooled 
regressions with bootstrapped standard errors.  Again, the t-statistics from Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) style regressions are qualitatively identical, though some the coefficients vary wildly in 
some panels due to the mentioned issue.  See Table Va below for results. 
 
INSERT TABLE V 
 
First, we sort stocks by size quartiles at the beginning of the previous year and test each of these 
size quartiles.
19  In Panel A, we see that the coefficient for contemporaneous turnover, x0, is 
positive and generally increasing in stock size.  The t-statistics are all increasing in stock size, from 
relatively insignificant to strongly significant.  This increasing pattern across stock size quartiles 
indicates that dealers trade less to provide liquidity and more on information for large-cap stocks.  
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One likely conclusion is that provision of liquidity is not as necessary for large, liquid stocks, as it 
is for small, illiquid stocks.  Another potential conclusion is that dealers are better able to detect 
material pricing information for large-cap stocks, and they trade accordingly.  Additionally, it 
seems that dealers trade out of positions in large capitalization stocks more aggressively. 
In the second subgroup, we examine dealer participation directly by sorting stocks by dealer 
gross turnover in the previous year,
20 reported in Panel B.  This time, the pattern across the 
coefficients for x0 does not show an obvious relation, though the t-statistics again suggest that 
higher dealer turnover in a given stock is associated with stronger contemporaneous relations 
between dealer turnover and stock returns.  We also find a curious pattern for stocks that dealers do 
not trade often.  For such stocks (quartile 1), the predictive return effect of dealer trade over the next 
5 weeks is extremely negative. 
In the third and final subgroup shown in Panel C, we sort dealers by dollar volume in the 
previous year.
2 0  In other words, we sort dealers by how actively they traded in the previous year.  
The pattern across the coefficient for x0 shows that large, active dealers have a larger positive 
contemporaneous price effect than small, inactive dealers.  The negative coefficients for quartiles 1 
(smallest) and 2 are consistent with models of liquidity provision, though neither coefficient is 
statistically significant.  We also find evidence of negative predictive effects of dealer order flow 
for active dealers (negative coefficients on the lagged order flow coefficients of the return 
regression), as well as positive feedback trading. 
 
E.  Test 2: Dealers Earn Excess Returns 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 In Panel A only we adjust returns by appropriate value-weighted size quartile returns instead of the 
aggregate value-weighted index, because of the significant size effect found in the summary statistics. 
20 In the first year of our sample period (1997), we used the same-year sorting.  The results using same-year 
sorting for every year are similar and not reported. 
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We find that dealers are profitable, with profits in the aggregate market driven by information 
rather than market making.  Thus, we confirm Hypothesis 2.  Table VI summarizes the results. 
 
INSERT TABLE VI 
 
Panel A reports the average weekly dollar profits to dealers, both in aggregate and across stock 
capitalization quartiles.  Total weekly profits are about NT$131 million, and it seems that profits 
from the largest stocks subsidize losses in the smaller stocks.  In particular, information profits in 
the largest quartile of stocks drives the entire result.  Market making profits are positive for 
quartiles 1 – 3 (and significant for quartiles 2 and 3), but negative for quartile 4.  Though liquidity 
provision can provide statistically significant profits for some stocks, the tiny magnitude of positive 
market making profits (excluding quartile 4) suggests that there are simply very little rents to 
liquidity provision.   
Panel B simply reports the return to each component in Panel A, where the base for the return 
calculation is the beginning-of-week inventory value in each period.  This allows comparison of 
profitability from each component relative to the total capital of the dealers.  Average unadjusted 
weekly returns for dealers is 28.4 basis points (about 14.76% annually) with a t-statistic of 0.94, 
over a period that the value-weighted index average return was -7.2 basis points weekly (about 
-3.74% annually). 
Panel C reports risk-adjusted returns to the information and market making component of 
returns.  The bases for return conversion of the information profits and market making profits are 
the dollars employed for information trades and market making trades, respectively.  Additionally, 
we adjust the information return for the appropriate value-weighted aggregate or quartile index 
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return in each period.
21  We do not adjust the market making return because the risk benchmark for 
market making profits is not clear; in fact zero might be the appropriate benchmark.  In addition, 
market making profits are from positions opened and closed in the same week.  Since dealers may 
open a position either by buying or selling, it is unclear whether they start by buying or selling and 
hence whether they are long or short for part of the week.  “Info-Index” denotes the risk-adjusted 
information returns, and “MM” denotes market making returns.  Information returns are positive in 
aggregate and for each quartile.  They are increasing in stock size and statistically significant for 
quartiles 2 to 4.  Market making profits are negative in aggregate, but they are positive and 
statistically significant for quartiles 1 to 3 and negative and statistically significant for quartile 4.  
They are decreasing from quartiles 2 to 4, and we conjecture that they are indeed greatest for 
quartile 1.  However, due to infrequent trading of the smallest stocks, dealers often cannot close out 
positions opened for market making reasons in the same week.  Finally, Panel C illustrates that 
dealers outperform the appropriate risk benchmark across the board, in each profit component of 
each stock size quartile. 
Regarding the magnitude of the information profitability, it is well-documented that mutual 
funds (and other institutions) in the US and internationally significantly outperform their 
benchmark indices before fees.  Since we do not have access to costs associated with being dealers, 
we cannot adjust for such costs.  We can only recognize that the extreme excess returns are not 
quite as high as they seem in our analysis.  For that matter, it is also unclear whether the fees should 
be deducted from information or market making returns. 
 
F.  Test 3: Dealers Infer Relevant Pricing Information 
                                                 
21 In principle, we would instead adjust for market beta or other systematic factors, but in preliminary tests we 
found that return patterns across beta and book to market are weak.  However, return patterns across size are 
clear and striking, hence we adjust for size quartile returns as described. 
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Test 1 is inconclusive with respect to whether dealers infer material pricing information, and 
Test 2 is suggestive that they do.  Hence we neither confirm nor reject Hypothesis 3.  Based on the 
VAR used to test Hypothesis 1, we see a strong contemporaneous price effect of dealer order flow, 
but little evidence of predictive effects.  However, in the subgroup analysis of Table Vc, we see that 
the most active dealers have a strong positive contemporaneous price effect followed by a possible 
reversal effect.  The magnitude of the reversal is about 50% of the initial price effect.  This indicates 
that the most active dealers may overtrade on what information they have, potentially taking 
advantage of positive-feedback strategies.  Other panels in the subgroup tests also show significant 
predictive effects, indicating potential strategic trading.  Based on Test 2, dealers are indeed 
profitable, and their profits are driven by the information component rather than the transaction 
(market making) component.  Although we cannot determine whether their information profits are 
driven by inside information, superior trading models, or inferred information, the magnitude of the 
profits is highly suggestive that dealers somehow infer material pricing information from their 
focus on order flow information.  
 
G.  Test 4: Dealers Trade More During Periods of Severe Order Imbalances 
Given that Tests 1 and 2 showed that dealers do not provide liquidity, the interpretation of this 
hypothesis has changed.  We find inconclusive evidence and can neither confirm nor reject 
Hypothesis 4.  Relative dealer volume is decreasing in return volatility and increasing in return 
kurtosis. 
 
INSERT TABLE VII 
 
In Panel A of Table VII, we report the results of regressing relative dealer volume on standard 
deviation of daily returns.  Using standard deviation as the independent variable, we find a 
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coefficient of -0.524.  On average, if return volatility is 1% higher during a given month then 
[dealer volume] / [market volume] will decrease by 0.524%.  The t-statistic of -4.10 indicates a 
statistically significant relation.  In Panel B, we observe that dealer turnover is positively related to 
kurtosis.  The interpretation of the coefficient of 0.003 is similar, and the t-statistic of 4.46 again 
indicates high statistical significance.  Panel C shows similar relations using both standard 
deviation and kurtosis as independent variables.  While the coefficients and t-statistics have 
decreased in magnitude, they are still significant and in the same direction as the univariate results. 
These results indicate that dealer relative trading volume is lower when volatility is higher, but 
higher during extreme price movements.  In additional tests, we find that the opposite relations hold 
when regressing absolute (instead of relative) dealer volume on the higher moments.  Dealers trade 
more during volatile periods and less during kurtotic periods, but the rest of the market trades even 
more during volatile periods and even less during highly kurtotic periods.  These results show that 
dealer relative trade may in fact be higher when the market needs it (highly kurtotic periods), but 
not necessarily during periods of high volatility. 
 
H.  Test 5: Dealer Trades Are Contemporaneously Correlated 
Our tests indicate cross-sectional dealer trade correlation of very similar magnitude as that 
found in previous studies; hence we confirm Hypothesis 5.  LSV studies herding among pension 
funds, a group that presumably shares common sources of information and common trading 
strategies.  They find an average herding measure of 2.7%, as well as a pattern that herding is 
stronger in smaller stocks than in larger stocks.  Other studies, such as Wermers (1999), find similar 
results for mutual funds and other trading groups.  Our results, as shown in Table VIII, confirm 
both the decreasing relation with stock size and absolute magnitude of the overall average measure 
(2.24% with our modified measure and 1.33% with the original LSV measure).  All results with 
both measures are statistically significant, including each of the size quartile results. 
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INSERT TABLE VIII 
 
LSV interprets that a measure of 2.7% indicates that on average in a given quarter for a given 
stock, 52.7% of pension funds bought (or sold) and 47.3% traded in the opposite direction.   
However, this interpretation is not entirely clear.  For example, given the adjustment factor AF, the 
maximum value of the measure in the special case of 2 dealers would be 25%.  This maximum 
would imply that 75% of dealers bought (or sold) and 25% traded in the opposite direction; even if 
dealers always traded together in perfect unison.  However, such perfect correlation between trades 
might imply a measure of 50% instead.  Therefore, the initial interpretation of the LSV measure 
underestimates actual herding in some cases. 
We use the LSV measure as a benchmark for comparison to investment funds and other groups 
that are known to have correlated trades.  With the LSV measure (and our modification), we 
conclude that dealers herd to a similar extent as pension funds and mutual funds.  Insofar as pension 
funds and mutual funds have common information and trading strategies, so do dealers. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
We have shown that in aggregate, dealers do not provide liquidity to the market; instead, they 
trade on information.  First, the contemporaneous correlation between dealer order flow and stock 
returns is highly positive, inconsistent with models of market maker trades.  Second, dealers earn 
significant excess returns which are in aggregate driven by the information component of profits.  
Patterns across stock size indicate that information profits are increasing in stock size and market 
making profits are decreasing in stock size.  Next, we explored higher moments of stock returns to 
gain further insight into when dealers trade.  Relative dealer volume is inversely related to volatility 
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and positively related to kurtosis.  Finally, we justified our aggregation of dealer trades by 
establishing a significant contemporaneous correlation across individual dealer order flow. 
The contemporaneous correlation and information profit results across stock size are consistent 
with the following theory.  Small firms have less analyst and media coverage and therefore exhibit 
higher information asymmetry via less publicly circulated information.  Insiders have a great 
information advantage for these companies, but they are few and therefore easily detectable and 
effectively restricted from releasing the information via insider trading.  Since there is little insider 
trading in small firms, it is difficult for market makers to extract information from order flow and 
earn information profits in small firms.  For large firms, it is easier for informed traders to trade 
without being detected by regulators.  Since informed traders are more willing to actively trade 
large firms’ stocks, dealers will be able to infer more information from order flow. 
The market making profit pattern across stock size also has an intuitive interpretation.   
Large-cap stocks are more liquid than small-cap stocks by many measures (higher volume, lower 
bid-ask spreads, etc.), likely because there is a much larger, active investor base.  When there are 
perceivable order imbalances in large-cap firms, there are more potential agents competing to 
absorb the imbalance.  Since the natural liquidity is higher for larger stocks, dealer liquidity 
provision for large firms does not have the same profit potential as for small firms; dealers must 
compete with other de facto dealers as well as natural liquidity.  The implication of both of these 
theories is that dealers may be necessary only for small or illiquid stocks. 
 
A.  Institutional and Policy Implications 
The recent controversy at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) highlights the regulatory 
attention given to liquidity provision.  Our results suggest that granting a set of institutional trading 
advantages to a class of investors and naming them “dealers” does not necessarily promote 
liquidity provision for other participants (though it may increase total trading volume).  Although 
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we find that market making can be profitable for small stocks, the small magnitude of the profits 
indicates that institutional incentives can do little to increase liquidity provision, short of mandating 
dealers to set narrowly placed bid and ask quotes at large depths.  Given such a liquidity mandate, it 
is unlikely that any institution would want to be a dealer unless liquidity provision activities are 
subsidized by advantages in other areas.  The subsidization of dealer profits and the social benefit 
of liquidity provision for those demanding immediacy are presumably funded at the expense of 
either “noise traders” or long-term investors, via large information profitability of dealers. 
Our findings from studying unconstrained dealers also indicate that there is a large shadow cost 
to liquidity mandates.  Therefore, it is natural that dealers with such mandates will try to 
strategically minimize this cost.  Two prominent examples of such strategic minimization of 
liquidity provision responsibilities are the 1997 NASDAQ price-fixing scandal and the current 
scrutiny on NYSE Specialists.  NASDAQ dealers were accused of collusion via large price ticks 
and for transacting against naturally crossing trades to “steal the spread.”  Recently, NYSE 
Specialists have also been accused of stealing the spread by blocking incoming trades temporarily, 
in addition to not employing enough capital aggressively toward liquidity provision.  In general, 
granting trading advantages to dealers and requiring them to provide liquidity in return leaves 
natural incentives to maximize their advantages and minimize their costs.  Hence, strategic trading 
by dealers will continue to whatever extent is allowed or undetectable by regulators. 
In the final analysis, the advantages afforded to dealers should be commensurate with the risks 
they take and the social benefit they provide through liquidity provision.  If they cannot provide this 
service, then the market should be left to provide liquidity for itself.  In particular, our evidence that 
dealers profit from information in large-cap stocks indicates that dealers are not necessary to ensure 
ample liquidity provision in these stocks.  Since dealers can profit from making markets in smaller, 
less liquid stocks, they may still play a valuable role in these stocks.  These takeaways are 
consistent with anecdotal evidence from two former NYSE Specialists about the lack of market 
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making profits in large stocks, as well as the Euronext market (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Paris) 
policy of having dedicated liquidity providers for all but the largest stocks.  Accordingly, other 
regulators should also consider whether the advantages given to dealers impart the incentive to 
provide liquidity at a reasonable cost, particularly for large and liquid stocks. 
 
B.  Future Research 
The results from this paper show conclusive evidence that unconstrained dealers do not provide 
liquidity on a weekly basis, and they are suggestive that they provide little liquidity within the week 
as well.  However, conclusive statements about higher frequency liquidity provision can only be 
made with higher-frequency data, and we hope to test this upon availability.  Furthermore, this 
paper focuses on aggregate dealer trading and behavior to establish that dealers are generally not 
liquidity providers.  In ongoing research, we further explore cross-sectional trading patterns across 
dealers to understand what drives differences in profitability across dealers, given the premise that 
they may not be liquidity providers. 
On a final note, the profit decomposition and return conversion illustrated in this paper have 
other natural applications.  One example is for mutual fund manager evaluations.  Given detailed 
transaction price and holdings data, our profit decomposition and return conversions can be applied 
at different frequencies (monthly, quarterly, annually) to differentiate fund managers’ long-term 
stock-picking ability from intra-period trading ability.  Since our information returns are based on 
stocks held for an entire period, standard risk benchmarking to determine risk-adjusted 
performance (alpha) is applicable.  However, current mutual fund evaluations do not take into 
account that trading profits should have a different risk benchmark.  By separating trading and 
information returns, we can choose appropriate benchmarks for each, instead of applying a single 
benchmark to total return.  Another example is in studies of liquidity and security return patterns, 
such as the hypothesized liquidity premium.  Just as size, bid-ask spreads, and market turnover 
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proxy for liquidity, so does dealer market making profitability.  The ability for dealers to make 
large market making profits indicates a low level of natural liquidity, and vice versa.  Given the 
availability of appropriate data, securities can be sorted by our definition of dealer market making 
profits, and this sorting can be used to test differences in return patterns across securities with 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table I.  Taiwan Stock Exchange Summary Statistics, 1997-2002 
The table reports weekly summary statistics for stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from January 
1997 to January 2002.  Panel A reports the number of firms, average share turnover, average market 
capitalization, and return statistics for the Value-Weighted Index (VW), Equal-Weighted Index (EW), and 
size quartiles (4 = largest).  Size quartile returns are value-weighted.  The unit of market capitalization is 
million New Taiwan dollars (NT$1,000,000).  Panel B reports return autocorrelations for the same portfolios 
in Panel A.  The standard errors for the autocorrelation estimates are roughly 0.062.  Returns and turnover are 
weekly and expressed in percent. 
 
 
Panel A: TSE Weekly Summary Statistics 
   Turnover  Market  Cap  Return 
   # Firms  (%)  (NT$mm)  Average  StdDev  Skew 
VW --  --    --  0.004% 4.272%  0.128 
EW  485  0.226%        17,438  -0.022%  4.182%  -0.057 
        
Quartile 1  121  0.277%           2,152  -0.767%  4.215%  0.016 
Quartile 2  121  0.251%           5,073  -0.369%  4.619%  -0.150 
Quartile 3  122  0.225%        10,737  -0.217%  4.520%  -0.221 
Quartile 4  121  0.148%        70,471  0.127%  4.366%  0.194 
        
        
Panel B: TSE Weekly Return Autocorrelations 
   Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Lag 5  Lag 6 
VW  -0.035 0.098 0.117 0.003  -0.014  -0.004 
EW  0.106 0.164 0.181 0.069 0.028 0.048 
        
Quartile 1  0.216 0.206 0.242 0.122 0.058 0.091 
Quartile 2  0.091 0.163 0.175 0.083  -0.001 0.054 
Quartile 3  0.030 0.149 0.153 0.062 0.000 0.044 




Table II.  TSE Dealer Trading Summary Information 
The table reports summary information about TSE Dealers from January 1997 to January 2002.  Panel A 
reports the number of dealers at the beginning of each year.  Panel B reports autocorrelation in aggregated 
dealer net order flow, first pooled across all listed and OTC stocks followed by cross-sectional mean and 
standard deviation.  Panel C reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) style aggregate dealer trading statistics 
(except for the number of stocks traded, which is per dealer per week).  First we calculate cross-sectional 
trading measures (net turnover, standard deviation of net turnover, skew of net turnover, etc.) across stocks 
for each time period.  We report the time series number of observations, mean, standard error, minimum, and 
maximum for each of these cross-sectional measures.  Turnover (Shares Traded / Shares Outstanding) is in 
percent and dollar volume is in NT$1,000s.   
 
 
Panel A: Number of Dealers by Year 
    1/1997 1/1998 1/1999 1/2000 1/2001 1/2002 
Number  of  Dealers  49 59 70 72 60 58 
        
        
Panel B: Autocorrelation of Aggregate Dealer Net Order Flow 
   Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Lag 5  Lag 6 
Pooled  Autocorrelation  0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.01 
Mean  Autocorrelation  0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.01 
Standard  Deviation  0.26 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 
N  (Stocks)  914 907 899 888 884 885 
 
 
Panel C: Aggregate Dealer Trading Statistics 
Trading Measure  Weeks  Mean  Std Err  Minimum  Maximum 
Mean  Net  Turnover  261 -0.009%  0.001% -0.076%  0.068% 
StDev  Net  Turnover  261 0.237% 0.006% 0.039% 0.695% 
Skew  Net  Turnover  261 -0.090%  0.026% -1.728%  1.736% 
        
Mean  Gross  Turnover  261 0.226% 0.007% 0.017% 0.697% 
StDev  Gross  Turnover  261 0.453% 0.027% 0.027% 3.593% 
Skew  Gross  Turnover  261 0.715% 0.031% 0.183% 2.698% 
        
Mean Net Dollar Volume  261   $       (440.3)   $         317.6    $  (18,255.0)   $    19,791.4  
StDev Net Dollar Volume  261   $    47,957.0    $      1,428.8    $      5,243.5    $ 126,370.2  
Skew Net Dollar Volume  261   $              0.1   $              0.3   $         (16.8)   $           13.9  
        
Mean Gross Dollar Volume  261   $    41,644.6    $      1,506.4    $      2,168.2    $ 128,097.9  
StDev Gross Dollar Volume  261   $ 124,191.0    $      4,686.1    $      7,402.5    $ 449,826.5  
Skew Gross Dollar Volume  261   $              6.1   $              0.1   $              2.2    $           12.9  
        
Mean Number of Stocks Traded  261              47.24                  1.09                 5.10               96.36  
StDev Number of Stocks Traded  261              36.88                  0.95                 3.91               69.29  




Figure 1.  Taiwan Stock Exchange Dealer Cross-Sectional Trading Activity 
This graph is a time series plot of the weekly dollar trading volume by dealers (in NT$1,000,000).  “10%,” 
“50%,” and “90%” refer to cross-sectional dealer dollar volume percentiles.  Each line plots the 























































































































































































Table III.  Dealer Order Flow and Stock Return VAR 
This table reports weighted Fama-MacBeth (1973) style regression results for the following VAR specification: 
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r is weekly stock return (excess over the value-weighted index), x is weekly aggregate dealer net order flow (net trade / shares outstanding), and TO is overall market 
turnover.  Panels A and B include listed (TSE) and over-the-counter (OTC) stocks, while Panels C and D include only TSE stocks.  r0 – r6 refer to the regression 
coefficients on independent return variables (A1-A6 for the return regressions and C0-C6 for the dealer order flow regressions), and x0 – x6 refer to the regression 
coefficients on independent dealer order flow variables (B0-B6 for the return regressions and D1-D6for the order flow regressions).  Bold indicates |t-statistic| ≥ 2.  




Panel A: TSE+OTC 
     
 
  Intercept                                r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
r                               -0.001 0.038 0.034 0.016 0.005 -0.011 -0.011  1.686  -0.151 0.151 0.022 -0.222 -0.058 0.102
t-stat                               -0.91 3.22 3.15 1.81 0.51 -1.28 -1.22  8.53  -0.96 0.97 0.15 -1.50 -0.44 0.65
                                
x                         0.000 2.07E-03  2.08E-04 1.07E-04 8.67E-05 4.64E-04  1.13E-04 -1.71E-05 0.074  -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 -0.026   
t-stat               -1.40 6.28  0.95 0.52 0.40 2.24  0.51 -0.09   4.94  -0.92 -1.27 -1.12 -0.32 -2.42   
                         
Panel B: TSE+OTC, Control TO 
          Intercept r0                              r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 TO
r                         -0.005    0.026 0.026 0.014 0.005 -0.013 -0.010  1.659  -0.178 0.161 -0.020 -0.213 -0.093 0.075 1.981 
t-stat                         -4.75    2.30 2.56 1.56 0.54 -1.52 -1.19  8.65  -1.03 1.10 -0.14 -1.51 -0.69 0.50 6.06 
                         
x                             0.000 2.16E-03  1.66E-04 7.47E-05 7.88E-05 4.53E-04  1.46E-04 -4.34E-05 0.074  -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.026 -0.023
t-stat                   1.03 7.12  0.76 0.37 0.38 2.13  0.66 -0.23   5.00  -0.86 -1.36 -1.04 -0.43 -2.42 -2.83
                         
Panel C: TSE 
     
 
  Intercept                                r0 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
r                           -0.001 0.023 0.027  0.010 0.000 -0.010 -0.015  2.089  0.085 0.093 -0.006 -0.243 -0.122 0.159  
t-stat                           -0.84 1.80 2.41  1.05 -0.03 -1.09 -1.56  9.94  0.46 0.62 -0.04 -1.57 -0.69 0.83  
                               
x                         0.000 2.78E-03  1.73E-04 1.59E-04 1.87E-04 6.17E-04  2.54E-05 1.25E-05 0.063  -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.029   
t-stat                 -0.62 7.59  0.72 0.71 0.76 2.63  0.10 0.06   4.13  -1.08 -1.11 -0.91 -0.36 -2.40   
                         
Panel D: TSE, Control TO 
          Intercept r0                              r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 TO
r                           -0.005  0.005 0.017 0.007 0.000 -0.012 -0.016  2.025  0.033 0.085 -0.022 -0.244 -0.081 0.151 2.163 
t-stat                           -5.46  0.42 1.61 0.75 0.00 -1.32 -1.73  9.91  0.18 0.60 -0.15 -1.60 -0.51 0.82 6.41 
                         
x                             0.000 2.85E-03  1.37E-04 1.30E-04 1.97E-04 6.00E-04  1.01E-04 2.20E-05 0.063  -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.006 -0.029 -0.022
t-stat                     1.76 8.43  0.57 0.59 0.85 2.51  0.40 0.11   4.17  -1.04 -1.17 -0.85 -0.43 -2.40 -2.74
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Table IV.  Dealer Order Flow and Stock Return VAR, Lagged Independent Variables Only 
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r is weekly stock return (excess over the value-weighted index), x is weekly aggregate dealer net order flow (net trade / shares outstanding), and TO is overall market 
turnover.  Only listed (TSE) stocks are used.  r0 – r6 refer to the regression coefficients on independent return variables (A1-A6 for the return regressions and C0-C6 
for the dealer order flow regressions), and x0 – x6 refer to the regression coefficients on independent dealer order flow variables (B0-B6 for the return regressions 
and D1-D6for the order flow regressions).  Bold indicates |t-statistic| ≥ 2.  Boxed indicates a group of lagged variable coefficients with consistent signs, which may 
indicate significant relations. 
 
 
Standard VAR (Lags Only): TSE, Control TO 
      Intercept     r1  r2  r3  r4  r5  r6     x1  x2  x3  x4  x5  x6 
r                             -0.001  0.024 0.026  0.009 0.001 -0.010 -0.015 0.208 0.134 -0.003 -0.242 -0.076 0.136
t-stat                              -0.722 1.870 2.384  0.970 0.057 -1.040 -1.582 1.130 0.879 -0.017 -1.583 -0.435 0.703
                             
x                      0.000  1.45E-04 1.29E-04 1.52E-04 6.02E-04  -5.37E-05 -2.03E-05    0.063  -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.029 
t-stat                        -0.379  0.620 0.577 0.634 2.508  -0.214 -0.098   4.119  -1.032 -1.171 -0.946 -0.384 -2.349 
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Table Va.  Dealer Order Flow and Stock Return VAR, Stock Quartiles by Market Capitalization 
This table reports pooled regression results for the following VAR specification across three types of quartiles: 
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r is weekly stock return (excess over the value-weighted index, except in Panel A where it is excess over the appropriate value-weighted quartile index return), x is 
weekly aggregate dealer net order flow (net trade / shares outstanding), and TO is overall market turnover.  All specifications use only listed (TSE) stocks.  Standard 
errors are estimated with a bootstrap procedure described in Section IIIA. 
 
Panel A reports results for stock size quartiles (4=largest), sorting stocks by market capitalization at the beginning of each year.  r0 – r6 refer to the regression 
coefficients on independent return variables (A1-A6 for the return regressions and C0-C6 for the dealer order flow regressions), and x0 – x6 refer to the regression 
coefficients on independent dealer order flow variables (B0-B6 for the return regressions and D1-D6for the order flow regressions).  Bold indicates |t-statistic| ≥ 2.  
Horizontal-Boxed indicates a group of lagged variable coefficients with consistent signs, which may indicate significant relations.  Vertical-Boxed indicates a 
pattern across quartiles in the t-statistics that may indicate an economic relationship across quartiles. 
 
 
Panel A: Stock Quartiles by Stock Capitalization (4=largest) 
          StockSize  Intercept r0 r1 r2                          r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 TO
r 1  0.002    0.067  -0.001                  0.009 -0.010 0.009 -0.008  0.625  0.102  -0.876  0.326 -0.414 -0.026 0.135 0.083
t-stat                      2.04    3.22  -0.06 0.50 -0.55 0.52 -0.53  1.34  0.29  -2.75  1.19 -1.22 -0.08 0.36 0.45
                                 
r                              2  -0.004  0.034 0.005 -0.004 0.010 0.005 -0.005 0.592 0.031 0.025 -0.362 -0.532 0.343 0.174 2.199 
t-stat                                -5.29  1.84 0.35 -0.25 0.67 0.40 -0.36 1.90 0.18 0.13 -2.03 -2.54 1.92 1.07 6.37 
                                  
r                          3  -0.005  0.007 0.029 -0.011 -0.012 -0.022 -0.010  1.477  0.019 0.015 -0.012 -0.142 -0.110 -0.201 3.081 
t-stat                            -6.26  0.44 1.74 -0.68 -0.86 -1.53 -0.80  7.18  0.11 0.10 -0.06 -0.81 -0.56 -1.21 9.36 
                                  
r                          4  -0.006  -0.015 0.024 0.019 -0.013 -0.019 -0.027  2.635  -0.094 0.204 -0.106 0.016 -0.199 -0.132 4.532 
t-stat                            -5.99  -0.84 1.36 1.06 -0.78 -1.12 -1.81  8.97  -0.42 0.85 -0.51 0.07 -1.03 -0.58 8.80 
                                 
                            
                        x 1  -0.126  7.20E-04 7.87E-04 6.65E-04 2.01E-04 4.50E-04 -6.44E-04  2.26E-04   0.293  -0.021 0.054 0.019 -0.023 0.000 -0.005 
t-stat                -4.15  1.29 1.31 1.56 0.56 1.41  -2.26  0.70   4.76  -0.47 1.76 0.69 -0.78 0.01 -2.23 
                              
x              2  -0.038  1.13E-03  -2.04E-04  3.73E-04  3.00E-04  -2.51E-04  -3.41E-05  1.16E-04   0.092  -0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.028 
t-stat                -1.50  1.88  -0.51  1.07  0.89  -0.66  -0.09  0.38   2.01  -0.22 -0.24 0.18 -0.67 -0.09 -2.76 
                             
x                          3  -0.042  2.56E-03  2.23E-04 -2.53E-04 -5.24E-04 4.60E-04 3.01E-04 4.24E-04 -0.004 -0.027 -0.003 -0.022 0.005 -0.039  -0.014 
t-stat                            -1.85  7.03  0.68 -0.67 -1.78 1.50 1.05 1.31 -0.22 -1.58 -0.17 -1.11 0.35 -2.08  -1.18 
                                 
x                              4  -0.042 2.51E-03 1.86E-04 -8.33E-05 -1.20E-04 4.73E-04  -5.34E-05 -8.53E-05 -0.002 -0.017 -0.018 -0.046  0.009 -0.002 0.005
t-stat                      -2.27 8.50  0.75 -0.39 -0.48  2.10  -0.22 -0.38 -0.14 -1.31 -1.26 -2.74  0.67 -0.14 0.58
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Table Vb.  Dealer Order Flow and Stock Return VAR, Stock Quartiles by Dealer Turnover 
This table reports pooled regression results for the following VAR specification across three types of quartiles: 
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r is weekly stock return (excess over the value-weighted index), x is weekly aggregate dealer net order flow (net trade / shares outstanding), and TO is overall market 
turnover.  All specifications use only listed (TSE) stocks.  Standard errors are estimated with a bootstrap procedure described in Section IIIA. 
 
Panel B reports results for stock quartiles (4=largest), sorting stocks by dealer gross turnover in the stock in the previous year (except in 1997, the 1997 sorting is 
applied).  r0 – r6 refer to the regression coefficients on independent return variables (A1-A6 for the return regressions and C0-C6 for the dealer order flow regressions), 
and x0 – x6 refer to the regression coefficients on independent dealer order flow variables (B0-B6 for the return regressions and D1-D6for the order flow regressions).  
Bold indicates |t-statistic| ≥ 2.  Horizontal-Boxed indicates a group of lagged variable coefficients with consistent signs, which may indicate significant relations.  
Vertical-Boxed indicates a pattern across quartiles in the t-statistics that may indicate an economic relationship across quartiles. 
 
 
Panel B: Stock Quartiles by Dealer Gross Turnover (4=highest) 
          GrossTO  Intercept r0 r1 r2                          r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 TO
r 1  -0.004    0.050  0.022                          0.014 -0.016 0.006 -0.032 2.171 -2.407 -1.706 -3.297 -3.762 -1.343 1.440 0.405
t-stat                      -2.08    2.09  0.74 0.72 -0.66 0.26 -1.46  0.96  -1.23  -0.97  -2.30 -2.35 -1.20 1.16 1.44
                                 
r                          2  -0.008  0.006 0.034 0.028 -0.021 -0.018 -0.024 1.391 0.402 -0.909 -0.722 0.519 -0.926  -0.116  2.781 
t-stat                -5.33  0.33 1.77 1.77 -1.27 -1.09 -1.53  1.71  0.68  -1.60  -1.49  1.13  -2.23  -0.26  5.33 
                               
r                            3  -0.007  0.007 0.025 0.016 -0.006 0.009 -0.009  1.601 -0.876 0.170 -0.549 -0.194 -0.070 -0.004 3.360 
t-stat                              -6.10  0.37 1.58 1.05 -0.38 0.63 -0.68  3.49 -2.59 0.50 -1.92 -0.69 -0.28 -0.02 8.46 
                            
r                        4  -0.006  -0.002 0.042  0.009 0.001 -0.002 -0.005  1.588  0.056 -0.028 -0.102 -0.150 0.068 -0.005 3.264 
t-stat                          -3.53  -0.08 2.21  0.51 0.07 -0.14 -0.36  9.01  0.45 -0.23 -0.86 -1.19 0.58 -0.04 8.70 
                             
                            
                              x 1  -0.011  5.47E-05 6.88E-05 3.45E-05 9.60E-06 2.08E-06 2.00E-05 4.45E-06 0.154  -0.003 0.020 -0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.002
t-stat                  -2.57  0.97 1.25 0.91 0.26 0.06 0.44 0.12   4.08  -0.16 1.63 -0.69 0.14 0.29 -1.74
                                
x                            2  -0.035  2.81E-04 -1.69E-04 -1.11E-05 -1.03E-04 -3.73E-05 4.43E-05 -6.91E-05 0.125  0.024 0.012 -0.002 0.007 0.009 -0.012 
t-stat            -4.06  1.71 -1.21 -0.09 -0.98 -0.36  0.38 -0.61   5.06  1.93 1.59  -0.23 0.70 0.78  -2.41 
                               
x                                3  -0.037 1.10E-03 4.12E-04 1.09E-04 -2.50E-05 1.12E-04 1.46E-04 2.54E-04 0.122 0.020 0.023 0.010 0.003 0.000 -0.016 
t-stat                    -2.45 3.21 1.58 0.53  -0.12 0.63 0.74 1.52   6.38 2.00 2.57 0.96 0.40 -0.05 -2.31 
                              
x                          4  -0.016  4.99E-03  3.11E-04 5.94E-05 3.97E-05 8.05E-04  -8.00E-05 2.42E-04 0.036 -0.019 -0.009 -0.023 -0.002 -0.018 -0.039 
t-stat                      -0.39  8.57  0.72 0.14 0.10 2.17  -0.20 0.66 1.92 -1.51 -0.77 -1.73 -0.20 -1.56 -2.49 
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Table Vc.  Dealer Trade and Stock Return VAR, Dealer Quartiles by Dollar Volume Traded 
This table reports pooled regression results for the following VAR specification across three types of quartiles: 
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r is weekly stock return (excess over the value-weighted index), x is weekly aggregate dealer net order flow (net trade / shares outstanding), and TO is overall market 
turnover.  All specifications use only listed (TSE) stocks.  Standard errors are estimated with a bootstrap procedure described in Section IIIA. 
 
Panel C reports results for dealer quartiles (4=largest), sorting dealers by dollar volume in the previous year (except in 1997, the 1997 sorting is applied).  r0 – r6 
refer to the regression coefficients on independent return variables (A1-A6 for the return regressions and C0-C6 for the dealer order flow regressions), and x0 – x6 
refer to the regression coefficients on independent dealer order flow variables (B0-B6 for the return regressions and D1-D6for the order flow regressions).  Bold 
indicates |t-statistic| ≥ 2.  Horizontal-Boxed indicates a group of lagged variable coefficients with consistent signs, which may indicate significant relations.  
Vertical-Boxed indicates a pattern across quartiles in the t-statistics that may indicate an economic relationship across quartiles. 
 
 
Panel C: Dealer Quartiles by Dollar Volume (4=highest) 
        Volume  Intercept r0 r1                            r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 TO
r                            1  -0.003  0.016 0.054  0.018 -0.006 0.005 -0.013 -0.682 -0.421 0.466 0.278 -0.692 0.349 -0.287 1.046 
t-stat                             -3.09  0.88 2.88  1.12 -0.40 0.29 -0.91 -0.97 -0.74 1.00 0.47 -1.39 0.80 -0.75 3.51 
                                  
r                            2  -0.006  -0.006 0.037  0.010 -0.003 -0.012 -0.018 -0.516 0.680 0.435 -0.060 0.115 0.246 0.545 2.628 
t-stat                              -5.83  -0.36 2.02  0.64 -0.17 -0.71 -1.20 -0.72 1.91 1.16 -0.16 0.28 0.66 1.52 7.38 
                             
r                        3  -0.005  0.010 0.038  0.020 0.001 0.009 -0.013  1.482  -0.299 -0.204 -0.175 0.082 0.017 -0.289 2.316 
t-stat                         -4.02  0.63 2.37  1.33 0.05 0.66 -1.04  4.37  -1.08 -0.65 -0.74 0.28 0.07 -1.14 4.60 
                               
r                        4  -0.006  -0.001 0.037  0.012 0.003 0.006 -0.014  1.765  -0.250 -0.120 -0.251 -0.103 -0.128 0.037 2.952 
t-stat       0.84                  -5.70  -0.03 2.23  0.19 0.43 -1.12  8.93  -1.36 -0.82 -1.73 -0.64 -0.88 0.25 8.48 
                           
                     
                                   
 
x 1 -0.005 -9.94E-05 1.46E-04 7.41E-05 2.58E-04 2.65E-05 1.61E-04 1.16E-04 0.105 0.033 0.022 0.001 0.020 0.031 -0.004
t-stat                                    -0.86 -1.07 0.90 0.55 1.76 0.29 1.44 1.33 1.19 0.99 1.48 0.04 0.47 1.53 -1.73
                            
x                      2  0.004  -1.03E-04  -2.39E-04  3.44E-05  -1.50E-04  -2.58E-05 1.84E-06 2.74E-05 0.001 -0.048 -0.022 0.007 -0.003 0.008 -0.014 
t-stat                       0.44  -0.66  -3.02  0.48  -2.01  -0.40 0.03 0.43 0.02 -1.38 -1.04 0.42 -0.14 0.78 -3.02 
                            
x                            3  -0.043 5.22E-04 -5.56E-05 -5.24E-05 -1.38E-04 8.81E-05 1.27E-04 4.22E-05 0.087  0.009  0.022  -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.004
t-stat               -5.87 4.20  -0.46 -0.52 -1.32  0.87 1.36 0.50   4.43  0.74  2.56  -0.55 -1.52 -0.85 -1.14
                             
x                            4  -0.016  2.00E-03  4.21E-04 -3.64E-06 -2.10E-04 3.25E-04 -1.81E-04 1.62E-04 0.057  -0.014 -0.015 -0.022 0.006 -0.030 -0.031
t-stat                  4 -1.10  7.87  1.98 -0.02 -1.30  1.90 -1.01 1.06   2.48  -0.91 -1.07 -1.35 0.53 -2.21 -4.03
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Table VIa.  Dealer Profit Decomposition, Dollar Decomposition 
The table reports details about dealer profits.  Dollar profits for each dealer in each stock in each week are 
decomposed into Information (Info), Market making (MM), and Mixed (Mix) components.  Profits to each 
component are aggregated across dealers and stocks for each time period, and significance tests are done with 
time-series profits. 
 
] [ ] [ ] [ nent MixedCompo t ngComponen MarketMaki nComponent Informatio + + = ∏
)] ( * [ )] ( * [ ] * * [ ) ( 1 1 buy t buy sell t t t P P NetBuy P P GrossSell r P INV NetTrade − + − + = + − − ∏
)] ( * [ )] ( * [ ] * * [ ) ( 1 1 sell t buy sell t t t P P NetBuy P P GrossBuy r P INV NetTrade − + − + = − − − ∏  
 
“NetTrade+” (“NetTrade-”) denotes a week in which the dealer was a net buyer (seller) of the stock.  See 
Section II for a detailed description and justification of the profit decomposition.  Panel A reports the raw 
dollar profits to each component in NT$1000s, in aggregate and across stock capitalization quartiles 
(4=largest).  The inventory data begin in May 1997, so the sample includes only 239 weeks (trading data 
begin in January 1997 and includes 261 weeks).  Bold indicates statistical significance, i.e. |t-statistic| ≥ 2, 
and t-statistics are placed below returns. 
 
 
Panel A: Dollar Profit Decomposition (NT$1,000s)       
   N  Total  Info  MM  Mix 
Aggregate  239   $    130,790   $    122,142   $          (393)   $         9,041 
   0.81  0.90  -0.11  0.33 
        
Quartile 1  239   $       (7,898)   $       (9,007)   $              68    $         1,041 
   -1.85  -2.28  0.69 1.78 
        
Quartile 2  239   $       (7,180)   $    (11,569)   $            765    $         3,623 
   -0.57  -1.01  3.96 2.70 
        
Quartile 3  239   $          (316)   $    (11,012)   $         2,692    $         8,005 
   -0.01  -0.42  5.34 2.30 
        
Quartile 4  239   $    146,183   $    153,729   $       (3,918)   $       (3,628) 
      1.17  1.51  -1.23  -0.15 
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Table VIbc.  Dealer Profit Decomposition, Return Decomposition and Risk-Adjusted 
Returns 
Panel B reports the return to each component and quartile in Panel A, where the base for return calculations is 
the beginning-of-week inventory value of stocks held in aggregate or in the appropriate quartile.  Panel C 
reports risk-adjusted returns to the market making profits and inventory profits.  The base for inventory 
returns is the beginning-of-week value of inventory held for the entire week, and the base for market making 
returns is the average between buy and sell values of positions opened and closed in the same week.  
Inventory returns are further adjusted by the appropriate value-weighted index.  Returns for Panel B are 
average weekly returns in percent (market making returns in Panel C are roughly half-weekly; the period 
cannot be determined exactly with our weekly data).  Bold indicates statistical significance, i.e. |t-statistic| ≥ 
2, and t-statistics are placed below returns. 
 
 
Panel B: Return Profit Decomposition, Base (NT$1,000,000s)       
   N  Base  Total  Info  MM  Mix   
Aggregate 239   $      51,456   0.284% 0.257%  0.004%  0.024%   
   40.97  0.94 1.01  0.52  0.47   
            
Quartile 1  239   $         1,486   -0.815%  -0.883%  0.006% 0.063%   
   28.40 -2.67 -3.08  1.30 1.84   
          
Quartile 2  239   $         4,109   -0.124% -0.232%  0.020% 0.088%   
   48.25  -0.43 -0.87  4.35 2.82   
           
Quartile 3  239   $         9,439   0.070% -0.054%  0.033%  0.091%  
   46.35  0.23 -0.20  5.60  2.30  
           
Quartile 4  239   $      36,422   0.466% 0.461%  -0.004%  0.009%   
      34.90  1.44 1.75  -0.39  0.14   
             
             
Panel C: Risk-Adjusted Returns, Bases (NT$1,000,000s)       
   N  BaseInfo  Info  Index  Info - Index  BaseMM  MM 
Aggregate 239   $      45,963   0.347% -0.072%  0.418%   $         3,168   -0.133% 
   41.29  1.20 -0.25  5.61 22.09  -1.29 
          
Quartile 1  239   $         1,432   -0.828%  -0.922%  0.094%   $              45   0.425% 
   29.14  -2.90  -3.36  0.77  8.29 2.25 
            
Quartile 2  239   $         3,880   -0.188% -0.503%  0.314%   $            101   0.801% 
   48.91  -0.67 -1.65  3.37 14.08  5.05 
          
Quartile 3  239   $         8,703   0.037% -0.346%  0.382%   $            411   0.564% 
   46.09  0.12 -1.16  5.29 16.97  4.97 
          
Quartile 4  239   $      31,948   0.587% 0.049%  0.538%   $         2,611   -0.265% 
      35.13  1.91 0.17  6.68 19.57  -2.24 
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Table VII.  Higher Moments: Volatility and Kurtosis 
This table reports the relation between dealer trading and higher moments of volatility and kurtosis.  For each 
month, we calculate volatility (Stdev) and kurtosis (Kurt) of daily returns as well as relative dealer trading 
volume (aggregate dealer trading volume / total market volume) for each stock.  Regression specifications are 
shown in each panel.  We implement Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regressions, i.e. cross-sectional 
regressions in each time period and weighted (by degrees of freedom) time-series parameter estimates and 
t-statistics.  All coefficients are statistically significant, and the effects of volatility and kurtosis on dealer 
relative volume are independent. 
 
 
Panel A: RelativeVolume = βStdev + ε   
Weighted Measure  N  Intercept  β  
Mean 66  0.056  -0.524   
t-stat 66  11.23  -4.10   
        
        
Panel B: RelativeVolume = βKurt + ε   
Weighted Measure  N  Intercept  β  
Mean 66  0.037  0.003   
t-stat 66  27.60  4.46   
        
        
Panel C: RelativeVolume = β1Stdev + β2Kurt + ε 
Weighted Measure  N  Intercept  β1  β2 
Mean 66  0.048  -0.302  0.002 




Table VIII.  Contemporaneous Correlation of Dealer Trades 
The table reports cross-sectional dealer trade correlation based on the herding measure from Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992): 
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B(i, t) and S(i, t) are the numbers of buyers and sellers, p(t) is the expected proportion of buyers in the current 
time period, and AF(i, t) is an adjustment factor equal to the expected value of the first term (inside absolute 
value bars) given the null of no herding and a binomial distribution of B(i, t) vs. S(i, t), with probability of B(i, 
t) equal to p(t).  “MOD” uses p(t) = 0.5 to reflect a null hypothesis that if there is no herding then half of 
dealers will buy and sell a given security in a given time period.  “LSV” uses p(t) as the proportion of buyers 
across all stocks and all dealers in time period t (see the Hypotheses section for details).  Q1 to Q4 are size 
quartiles (Q4=largest).  Both measures are statistically significant in aggregate and in size quartiles. 
 
 
Contemporaneous Correlation of Dealer Trades 
   N  MOD  MOD t-stat  LSV  LSV t-stat 
Aggregate 41365  2.24%  24.13  1.33%  15.81 
          
Quartile 1  3021  5.60%  13.55  4.65%  12.39 
Quartile 2  4942  2.57%  8.23  1.87%  6.59 
Quartile 3  10351  1.26%  6.31  0.98%  5.37 
Quartile 4  22945  2.15%  19.49  0.92%  9.28 
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